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Portraits	of	Philosophers		Hans	Maes					 	
Abstract		This	paper	presents	a	close	analysis	of	Steve	Pyke’s	famous	series	of	portraits	of	philosophers.	By	comparing	 his	 photographs	 to	 other	 well-known	 series	 of	 portraits	 and	 to	 other	 portraits	 of	philosophers	we	will	seek	a	better	understanding	of	the	distinctiveness	and	fittingness	of	Pyke’s	project.	 With	 brief	 nods	 to	 Roland	 Barthes,	 Jean	 Baudrillard,	 G.W.F.	 Hegel,	 and	 Arthur	Schopenhauer	and	an	extensive	critical	 investigation	of	Cynthia	Freeland’s	 ideas	on	portraiture	in	general	and	her	reading	of	Steve	Pyke’s	portraits	in	particular,	this	paper	will	also	aim	to	make	a	contribution	to	the	philosophical	debate	on	portraiture.						
NB	Final	version	to	appear	in	H.Maes	(ed.)	Portraits	and	Philosophy,	Routledge,	2019.		https://www.routledge.com/Portraits-and-Philosophy/Maes/p/book/9780367189402		Please	do	not	quote	without	permission.						 	
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	Could	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 portraits	 of	 philosophers	 help	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	philosophy	of	portraits?	Conversely,	can	we	turn	to	the	philosophy	of	portraiture	to	help	illuminate	some	of	the	ways	in	which	philosophers	have	been	portrayed?	These	 are	 the	 general	 questions	 I	 would	 like	 to	 address	 in	 this	 concluding	chapter	 –	 a	 chapter	 that	 will	 mainly	 focus	 on	 the	 work	 of	 one	 photographer,	Steve	Pyke,	 and	 the	 series	of	black-and-white	portraits	of	philosophers	 that	he	took	over	a	span	of	thirty	years	and	collected	in	two	volumes	(1993,	2011a).i		My	 starting	 point	 will	 be	 the	 decidedly	 mixed	 review	 that	 these	 photobooks	received	 from	 prominent	 philosopher	 of	 portraiture,	 Cynthia	 Freeland	 (2011),	who	 considers	 the	 series	 unflattering	 and	 unsuitable	 to	 its	 lofty	 subject.	 I	will	take	 issue	 with	 her	 reading	 and	 offer	 an	 alternative	 perspective	 on	 Pyke’s	portraits	 that	 will	 hopefully	 result	 a	 renewed	 appreciation	 of	 their	distinctiveness.			To	 grasp	how	distinctive	Pyke’s	 series	 of	 portraits	 really	 is,	 I	will	 compare	his	work	 to	 other	 series	 of	 portraits	 (section	 1	 and	 2)	 and	 other	 portraits	 of	philosophers		(section	3).	I	will	also	draw	on	some	insights	from	the	philosophy	of	portraiture,	with	brief	nods	to	Roland	Barthes,	Jean	Baudrillard,	G.W.F.	Hegel,	and	Arthur	Schopenhauer	and	a	more	elaborate	critical	investigation	of	Cynthia	Freeland’s	ideas	on	portraiture.			
<FIGURE	1	Arthur	Danto	HERE>				
Oddity	and	flattery	
		It’s	 not	 hard	 to	 see	 why,	 generally	 speaking,	 many	 portraits	 offer	 flattering	images	of	their	sitters.	After	all,	it	is	the	sitters	themselves	who	often	commission	and	promise	 to	pay	 for	 the	portrait	–	on	 the	condition,	of	course,	 that	 they	are	pleased	with	the	end	result.	Certainly	in	the	pre-modern	era,	when	many	artists	were	 entirely	 dependent	 on	 their	 patrons,	 portraiture	 and	 flattery	 would	frequently	 go	 hand-in-hand.	 This	 began	 to	 change	 when	 artists	 gained	 more	autonomy	 and	 gradually	 obtained	 the	 freedom	 and	means	 to	 select	 their	 own	sitters	 as	 well	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 these	 sitters	 would	 be	 depicted	 (Berger	1969).	That	development	culminated,	one	could	argue,	in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century	when	certain	portrait	artists	seemed	to	aim	for	the	direct	opposite	of	flattery.			
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Diane	Arbus	 is	 a	 prime	 example.	 Arbus	 famously	 said	 about	 her	 own	practice:	‘You	see	someone	on	the	street	and	essentially	what	you	notice	about	them	is	the	flaw.	 There's	 a	 point	 between	 what	 you	 want	 people	 to	 know	 about	 you	 and	what	you	can't	help	people	knowing	about	you’	(Arbus	1972,	pp.	1-2).	It	was	this	point	that	she	would	seek	out	as	a	photographer.	One	can	observe	it	in	some	of	her	 best	 portraits	 such	 as	 Puertorican	 Woman	 with	 Beauty	 Mark	 (1965)	 or	
Woman	with	a	Veil	on	Fifth	Avenue	(1968).			Her	friend	and	fellow	New	Yorker,	Richard	Avedon,	adopted	a	similar	strategy	in	his	 influential	 series	 In	 the	American	West	 (1985).	 Subjects	 in	 this	 series	 look	marginalized	and	odd	and	are	often	deliberately	placed	off	kilter	in	the	frame	to	suggest	 social	 and	 mental	 instability.	 Telling	 examples	 are	 Bill	 Curry,	 Drifter,	
Interstate	 40,	 Yukon,	 Oklahoma	 (1980)	 and	 Dave	 Timothey,	 Nuclear	 Fallout	
Victim,	 Orem,	 Utah	 (1980).	 These	 stark	 black-and-white	 portraits	 offer	 up	anything	but	a	flattering	image	of	the	American	West.	 	In	 her	 review	 for	The	Philosophers	Magazine,	 Cynthia	 Freeland	 seems	 to	 place	Steve	 Pyke	 and	 his	 Philosophers	 series	 squarely	 within	 this	 lineage	 of	photographers:	 ‘The	 pictures	 suggest	 that	 Pyke	 …	 finds	 philosophers	 strange.	Here	we	find	philosophers,	warts	and	all:	wild	eyebrows,	unkempt	beards,	 lank	hair,	 lantern	 jaws,	 crossed	 eyes,	weak	 chins,	 bad	 teeth,	weird	noses’	 (Freeland	2011,	p.	52).	She	notes	how	Pyke’s	lens	choices	and	his	penchant	for	the	extreme	close	up	 ‘can	distort	 facial	 features	 in	unflattering	ways’	(2011,	p.	56)	and	how	there	are	several	instances	‘in	which	the	prints	show	the	face	of	a	sitter	as	bright	white	against	a	dark	background,	making	it	seem	to	float	above	the	picture	plane	…	 inducing	 a	 kind	 of	 alienation	 effect’	 (2011,	 p.	 56).	 His	 portrait	 of	 Mary	Mothershill	would	be	a	case	in	point.	Freeland	concludes:	‘What	do	philosophers	actually	 look	 like?	Rather	 odd,	 I’m	 afraid,	 or	 if	 truth	be	 told,	 unappetizing	 –	 at	least	if	we	are	to	go	on	this	collection	of	portraits	by	Steve	Pyke’	(2011,	p.	52).		However,	there	is	something	not	quite	right	about	placing	Pyke	in	this	lineage	of	photographers.	 Yes,	 the	 aesthetic	 affinity	 with	 both	 Arbus	 (who	 also	 used	 a	Rolleiflex	camera	and	preferred	the	square	format	print)	and	Avedon	(the	high-contrast	black-and-white,	the	inclusion	of	the	negative’s	frame)	is	unmistakable.	But	 Pyke’s	 portraits	 differ	 in	 at	 least	 one	 very	 important	 respect.	 In	 Avedon’s	
American	West	and	 also	 in	 Arbus’s	work,	 oddity	 and	 alienation	 are	 a	 constant	feature.ii	They	would	consistently	select	subjects	that	stood	out	in	some	way	and	then	 use	 various	 photographic	 techniques	 to	 emphasize	 their	 strangeness	 and	marginality.	Not	so	with	Pyke.	Strangeness	is	not	a	criterion	for	inclusion	in	the	
Philosophers	 series.	 The	 only	 relevant	 criterion	 is	 the	 particular	 philosopher’s	standing	 in	 the	profession.	Only	 if	 they	are	nominated	by	at	 least	 two	or	 three	other	 prominent	 philosophers	 will	 Pyke	 contact	 said	 philosopher	 and	 create	their	portrait.			
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	Pyke	 also	 does	 not	 go	 out	 of	 his	 way	 to	 depict	 philosophers	 as	 odd	 and	unappetizing.	 Plenty	 of	 portraits	 are	 testimony	 to	 this.	 His	 portraits	 of	 Susan	James,	David	Papineau,	 Jerrold	Levinson,	Delia	Graff	Fara,	show	dignified,	well-coiffed,	 handsome	 individuals.iii		 <FIGURE	 2	 Jerrold	 Levinson	 HERE>	 Or	 take	 his	beautiful	portrait	of	Arthur	Danto.	Danto	had	strabismus	–	a	feature	you	couldn’t	help	notice	when	you	encountered	him.	Someone	like	Arbus	would	surely	have	sought	out	 this	particular	 characteristic	 (the	 ‘flaw’),	 but	not	Pyke.	Granted,	 the	portrait	series	has	its	share	of	wild	eyebrows,	unkempt	beards,	and	weird	noses.	But	that	doesn’t	yet	mean	that	there’s	a	deliberate	effort	on	Pyke’s	part	to	show	philosophers	in	an	unflattering	light.	That	would	be	completely	contrary	to	what	originally	 inspired	him	to	make	the	series.	As	he	explains	 in	an	 interview:	 ‘The	Philosophy	Tribe	is	made	up	of	thinkers,	which	is	an	honorable	profession	that	deserves	a	wider	audience…	I’m	interested	in	some	way	of	putting	philosophers	on	more	people’s	radars’	(Stanley	2011,	p.	11).  			So,	we	need	a	different	frame	of	reference.	One	photographer	that	comes	to	mind	is	Walker	Evans,	particularly	his	series	Many	are	called	(1938-41;	1966).	For	this	project	Walker	Evans	 took	candid	pictures	of	 subway	passengers	 in	New	York.	He	 did	 this	 by	 hiding	 his	 camera	 underneath	 his	 coat	 and	 photographing	 the	random	people	who	sat	across	from	him.	In	this	series,	too,	one	encounters	some	unkempt	bears,	 odd	 looks,	 and	weird	noses.	But,	 as	 is	 the	 case	with	Pyke,	 one	cannot	 say	 that	 the	 photographer	 is	 deliberately	 seeking	 out	 such	 features.	 It	would	all	depend	on	who	happened	to	sit	 in	 front	of	his	 lens	on	that	particular	day	 in	 the	 subway.	 (Cf.	 the	 work	 of	 DiCorcia,	 discussed	 elsewhere	 in	 this	volume.)		Walker	Evans’s	aim	was	a	documentary	one	and	he	very	much	valued	‘neutrality’	in	pursuing	this	aim.	As	he	later	wrote,	it	was	his	idea	of	what	portraiture	ought	to	be:	 ‘anonymous	and	documentary	and	a	straightforward	picture	of	mankind’	(Evans	1971).	Taking	the	subjectivity	of	the	photographer	out	of	the	equation,	in	favour	of	 the	automatism	of	photography,	was	 thus	partly	what	 the	 series	was	about.	 It	 is	 here	 that	 we	 see	 a	 notable	 difference	 with	 Pyke.	 There	 is	 no	anonymous	observation	in	the	Philosophers	series.	All	philosophers	consented	to	being	 photographed	 and	 participated	 in	 the	 process.	 Taking	 pictures	 without	permission	 or	 taking	 the	 photographer	 out	 of	 the	 exchange	was	 never	 on	 the	cards.	Pyke	himself	puts	it	very	aptly:			 ‘People	talk	about	taking	pictures.	It’s	a	word	I	never	ever	use	because	‘taken’	is	 the	 wrong	 adjective.	 If	 it’s	 anything,	 it’s	 giving.	 You	 know,	 you’re	 giving	pictures.	 It’s	 a	 collaboration,	 it’s	 like	 a	 conversation	…	 it’s	 going	backwards	and	forwards,	we’re	both	learning	different	things	about	each	other	but	also	about	what	it	is	that	we	do.	It’s	all	about	exchange.’	(Pyke	2011b)iv	
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	Because	his	aim	was	never	to	observe	anonymously,	Pyke	was	not	forced	to	keep	his	distance	in	the	way	that	Walker	Evans	was.	Instead	he	could	come	very	close	to	 his	 subjects,	 creating	 a	 sense	 of	 intimacy	 that	 is	 noticeably	 lacking	 in	 the	subway	series.			So	 perhaps	 the	 work	 of	 someone	 like	 David	 Bailey	 or,	 more	 recently,	 Platon	offers	a	better	comparison.	In	Box	of	Pin-Ups	(1965)	Bailey	presents	a	collection	of	 portraits	 of	 celebrities	 that	were	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 London’s	 Swinging	 Sixties:	Michael	 Cain,	 Rudolf	 Nurejev,	 the	 Beatles,	 and	 other	 fashionable	 folk	 are	captured	in	striking	high	contrast,	black	and	white,	square	format	photographs.	Similarly,	 Platon	 was	 able	 to	 portray	 an	 impressive	 list	 of	 world	 leaders,	including	 Putin,	 Erdogan,	 Berlusconi,	 and	 George	 W.	 Bush,	 for	 a	 series	 called	
Power	(2011).	In	contradistinction	to	Walker	Evans,	and	very	much	in	line	with	Pyke’s	practice,	both	these	photographers	opt	for	the	extreme	close-up	and	make	no	 effort	 to	 hide	 the	 I-You	 relation	 between	 photographer	 and	 photographed	subject.	 The	 sitters	 in	 these	 two	 other	 series	 also	 share	 a	 distinctive	 group–identity	 (influential	 politicians,	 London-based	 celebrities)	 as	 is	 true	 for	 the	
Philosophers	series.	v			And,	yet,	there	is	also	a	remarkable	difference	between	Pyke’s	approach	and	the	portraits	 in	Power	or	Box	of	Pin-Ups.	Bailey	and	Platon	clearly	glamourize	 their	sitters.	 Bailey’s	 actors	 and	 musicians	 are	 invariably	 depicted	 as	 hip	 and	 cool.	There	are	no	blemishes	 in	 their	appearance.	Platon’s	politicians	always	appear	powerful	 and	 charismatic.	 Lighting	 is	 even	 arranged	 so	 that	 their	 heads	 seem	surrounded	by	a	halo.	Nothing	could	be	further	from	the	way	Pyke	photographs	his	philosophers.	There’s	no	halo	 there,	no	effort	 to	hide	any	blemishes.	Pyke’s	revealing	close-ups	are	not	at	all	about	glamourizing	the	sitter.			Still,	as	we	have	already	established,	and	as	is	clear	from	the	pictures,	Pyke	does	not	 set	 out	 to	 mock,	 belittle	 or	 expose	 the	 philosophers.	 So,	 what	 are	 the	portraits	 about	 then?	 Why	 does	 he	 opt	 for	 the	 all-revealing	 close-up,	 if	demystification	is	not	the	aim?	We	find	the	answer	in	a	final	comparison	with	yet	another	photographic	series:	Pyke’s	own	Astronauts	(1990s).		
	
	
Proximity	and	puzzlement			The	 series	Astronauts	 consists	 of	 photographs	of	 the	 gear	 that	 astronauts	 took	with	them	into	space,	some	of	the	rocks	they	brought	back	from	the	Moon,	and	some	 of	 the	 instruments	 that	 were	 crucial	 in	 their	 endeavor.	 It	 also	 includes	
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close-up	portraits	of	the	astronauts	themselves:	mainly	of	their	faces	but	in	one	instance	also	of	the	last	foot	to	have	walked	the	surface	of	the	moon.			
<FIGURE	3	Last	Foot	HERE>		
	Like	the	Philosophers	series,	the	project	was	largely	self-funded	and	the	result	of	a	strong	personal	fascination	on	the	part	of	the	photographer.	As	he	explains	in	the	documentary	Moonbug,	he	had	always	been	awestruck	by	space	travel	and	by	missions	to	the	Moon	in	particular.	But	becoming	an	astronaut	himself	just	never	was	a	live	option	(Pyke	quit	school	when	he	was	seventeen).	So,	photographing	the	people	who	did	visit	the	moon	became,	as	he	puts	it,	‘the	next	best	thing’.			To	 understand	why	 these	 close-up	 photographs	 would	 count	 as	 the	 next	 best	thing,	 it	 helps	 to	 keep	 C.S.	 Peirce’s	 distinction	 between	 ‘icons’	 and	 ‘indexes’	 in	mind.	 Roughly	 speaking,	 icons	 represent	 in	 virtue	 of	 resembling	 their	 referent,	whereas	 indexes	 represent	 in	virtue	of	 a	physical	relation	 to	 their	 referent,	 e.g.	smoke	being	an	index	of	fire.	‘An	Index	is	a	sign	which	refers	to	the	Object	that	it	denotes	by	virtue	of	being	really	affected	by	that	Object.’1,	says	Peirce	(1955,	p.	102).	 	 Photographs,	 it	 has	 often	 been	 pointed	 out,	 qualify	 as	 both	 icons	 and	indexes.	 They	will	 typically	 resemble	 their	 referent	 in	 some	way,	 but	 are	 also	directly	affected	by	the	referent,	in	that	light	bounces	off	the	object	in	front	of	the	lens	 and	 onto	 the	 contact	 sheet.	 It’s	 the	 latter	 aspect	 that	 helps	 to	 understand	what	motivated	 Pyke	 to	make	 the	Astronaut	series.	 By	making	 a	 photographic	imprint	of	those	moon	rocks	or	of	the	last	foot	to	have	left	its	print	on	the	moon,	Pyke	seeks	to	establish	a	direct	line	of	contact	between	himself	and	the	Moon.	It	is	this	sense	of	physical	proximity	that	produces	the	chills	that	he	reports	feeling	in	the	presence	of	these	astronauts	and	their	space	gear.			My	contention	 is	 that	we	need	 to	 interpret	 the	Philosophers	 series	 in	much	 the	same	 way.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Pyke’s	 portraits	 of	 philosophers	 are	 meant	 to	function	 as	 “icons”.	 Many	 people	 don’t	 know	 what	 the	 most	 prominent	philosophers	of	our	time	 look	 like	and	the	photographic	series	aims	to	address	that.	 ‘They	are	 in	essence	the	world’s	big	thinkers,	and	yet	we	don’t	know	who	they	are.	That	really	interested	me;	that	they	were	kind	of	faceless’	(Pyke	2015).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 photographs	 are	 also	 meant	 to	 function	 as	 “indexes”,	whereby	 a	 sense	 of	 contact	 is	 key.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 Roland	 Barthes:	 ‘The	photograph	is	literally	an	emanation	of	the	referent.	From	a	real	body,	which	was	there,	 proceed	 radiations	which	 ultimately	 touch	me,	who	 am	here;	…	 like	 the	delayed	rays	of	a	star’	(Barthes	1981,	pp.	80-81).	Thus,	the	portraits	gave	Pyke	(and	are	meant	to	give	the	viewer)	a	chance	to	establish	a	connection	and	get	up	close	 and	 personal	 with	 these	 intellectual	 stars.	 Pace	 Freeland,	 I	 would	 argue	that	 it	 is	 fascination	 and	 admiration,	 rather	 than	demystification,	 that	 helps	 to	
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explain	 the	 all-revealing	 close-up.	 (Often,	 the	 closer	 an	 admirer	 can	 get	 to	 the	object	of	admiration,	the	better.vi)	This	is	one	reason	why	I	find	the	series	quite	fitting:	viewers	fascinated	by	philosophy	are	allowed	an	intimate	encounter	with	leading	thinkers	and	are	given	the	chance	to	get	close	to	this	particular	kind	of	greatness.				A	couple	of	things	are	worth	noting	 in	this	context.	First,	Pyke	does	not	always	opt	 for	 the	 close-up	 and	 keeps	 a	 fair	 amount	 of	 distance	 when	 the	 sitter	 is	someone	he	does	not	admire	–	as	was	pointedly	the	case	for	his	famous	portrait	of	Augusto	Pinochet	for	The	New	Yorker	(1998).	Secondly,	in	claiming	that	Pyke’s	portraits	of	philosophers	are	setting	the	viewer	up	for	an	intimate	meeting,	I	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	viewers	will	become	familiar	with	intimate	details	of	the	philosopher’s	 personal	 lives	 or	 with	 their	 innermost	 secrets.	 Rather,	 intimacy	here	 refers	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 physical	 proximity,	 of	 seeing	 the	philosophers	from	so	close	a	distance	as	 is	ordinarily	reserved	for	those	who	are	actually	on	an	 intimate	 basis	 with	 them.vii 	Thirdly,	 likeness	 and	 recognisability	 can	 be	somewhat	compromised	due	to	the	unusual	proximity	of	the	lens	to	the	face	in	making	these	photographs.	Pyke	is	aware	of	this	and	comments	on	the	fact	that	sitters	 often	 don’t	 immediately	 recognize	 themselves:	 ‘On	 a	most	 fundamental	level	one	may	question	a	 likeness	“How	is	that	me?	…	it	doesn’t	 look	like	me	…	but	 it	 is	there	in	front	of	me	…	it	 is	a	photograph	of	me.”’	But	he	adds,	creating	‘that	 moment	 of	 puzzlement	 is	 at	 the	 very	 least	 a	 beautiful	 byproduct	 of	photography’	(Stanley	2011,	11).	This	may	be	another	reason	to	consider	Pyke’s	approach	quite	 fitting.	After	all,	puzzlement	 is	also	at	 the	very	 least	a	beautiful	byproduct	of	philosophy.			Pyke	very	much	welcomes	the	puzzlement	that	his	portraits	tend	to	induce.	In	so	doing,	 he	 articulates	 and	 demonstrates	 an	 important	 insight	 regarding	portraiture	 in	general,	namely	 the	 idea	 that	puzzlement	and	perplexity	(“Is	this	
really	 X?”)	 are	 not	 necessarily	 bad-making	 features	 for	 a	 portrait.	 On	 the	contrary,	it’s	what	makes	some	portraits	particularly	compelling.	A	case	in	point,	besides	Pyke’s	own	work,	would	be	Lucian	Freud’s	head-and-shoulder	portraits	(which	exhibit	a	framing	and	topography	of	the	skin	that	is	similar	to	Pyke’s)	or	many	 of	 John	 Deakin’s	 portraits	 (their	 combination	 of	 blurriness	 and	 dark	shadows	shows	affinities	with	some	of	Pyke’s	more	‘puzzling’	photographs,	such	as	the	ones	he	did	of	Rae	Langton	and	Peter	Ludlow).				This	 basic	 insight	 poses	 a	 direct	 challenge	 to	 a	widely	 held	 but	 ultimately	 too	narrow	 belief,	 namely	 that	 all	 great	 portraits	 offer	 clarity	 by	 capturing	 or	distilling	 the	 essence	 of	 a	 person	 (“This	 really	 is	X!”).	 That	 belief,	which	 I	 have	elsewhere	 labelled	 the	 ‘standard	 view’	 of	 greatness	 in	 portraiture,	 is	 given	philosophical	credence	by	Freeland	in	her	monograph	Portraits	&	Persons	where	she	 notes	 how	 ‘the	 greatest	 portraits	 …	 reveal	 someone’s	 essential	 nature	 or	
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their	character	 in	a	deep	sense’	and	that	 ‘the	best	portraits	manifest	a	person’s	“air”,	 their	 unique	 essence	 or	 inner	 character’	 (2010,	 p.	 44).viii	Given	 this	 firm	normative	stance	on	portraiture,	it	should	not	come	as	surprise	that	Freeland	is	less	than	enthusiastic	about	Pyke’s	work.			But	whereas	Freeland	is	somewhat	disappointed,	G.W.F.	Hegel	would	have	been	downright	horrified	to	witness	such	depictions	of	philosophers.	In	his	Lectures	on	
Fine	Art	he	devised	some	instructions	for	the	portrait	artist:	‘the	portrait-painter	...	must	flatter,	in	the	sense	that	…	the	purely	natural	side	of	imperfect	existence,	little	 hairs,	 pores,	 little	 scars,	 warts,	 all	 these	 he	 must	 let	 go,	 and	 grasp	 and	reproduce	 the	 subject	 in	 his	 universal	 character	 and	 enduring	 personality’	(Hegel	1975,	p.	155).	Or,	as	he	also	puts	it,	‘the	portrait	painter	will	omit	folds	of	skin	 and,	 still	 more,	 freckles,	 pimples,	 pock-marks,	 warts,	 etc…	 For	 in	 all	 this	there	 is	 little	or	nothing	of	 the	 spirit,	 and	 the	expression	of	 the	 spiritual	 is	 the	essential	 thing	 in	 the	 human	 form’	 (1975,	 p.	 165).	 In	 order	 for	 the	 artist	 to	capture	 the	 sitter’s	 universal	 character,	 ‘he	 must	 have	 seen	 him	 in	 several	situations	and	actions,	in	short	been	well	acquainted	with	him’	(1975,	p.	165).		Pyke,	 of	 course,	 does	 none	 of	 these	 things.	 	 He	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 become	well	acquainted	with	his	sitters	(a	photo-session	will	typically	take	less	than	an	hour).	Furthermore,	he	emphatically	does	not	omit	folds	of	skin,	pimples,	pock-marks,	warts,	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	 capture	 a	 sitter’s	 spiritual	 personality.	 From	Hegel’s	 perspective	 this	 is	 particularly	 horrifying	 because	 Pyke’s	 sitters	 are	
philosophers	 and	 it	 is	 precisely	 in	 philosophy,	 according	 to	 Hegel,	 that	 spirit	achieves	its	ultimate,	absolute	understanding	of	itself.				
Philosophers	and	pharmacists		There	is	one	more	reason	why	Freeland	considers	the	series	a	failure	that	bears	mentioning:	 ‘The	problem	 is	 that	 there	 is	 not	 really	 anything	 to	be	 seen	 about	philosophers	per	se’	 (2011,	p.	54).	Pyke’s	book	 is	entitled	Philosophers	but	one	might	as	well	guess	that	his	sitters	are	pharmacists	or	magicians.	So,	according	to	Freeland,	 his	 approach	 does	 not	 appear	 particularly	 suitable	 or	 attuned	 to	 its	subject.			This	is,	of	course,	partly	due	to	how	the	series	is	set	up:	‘the philosophers seen here 
are mostly heads (remember those aliens from Star Trek). Rarely do they have bodies. 
Nor do they employ any tools of their trade.’ (2011,	p.	54).	Pyke’s	headshots	carry	no	 information	 about	 the	 characteristic	 attire,	 accessories,	 and	 activities	 of	philosophers.	In	that	respect	they	appear	rather	mute.	We	can	contrast	this	with	other	well-known	portraits	of	philosophers.	Think	of	Hans	Holbein’s	portrait	of	
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Erasmus	 (1523),	 Peter	 Paul	 Rubens’	 Four	 Philosophers	 (1611-12),	 or	 Louis-Michel	 van	Loo’s	portrait	 of	Diderot	 (1767).	Here	 the	 clothing,	 setting,	 tools	of	the	 trade,	 and	 depicted	 activity	 are	 clues	 that	 enable	 an	 artist	 to	 portray	someone	as	a	philosopher.	Pyke’s	portraits,	on	 the	other	hand,	offer	 the	viewer	no	clues	in	terms	of	clothes,	setting,	or	accessories.			That	 said,	his	 approach	does	have	one	big	advantage.	By	 removing	 those	 clues	from	the	final	image,	Pyke	effectively	removes	anything	that	could	distract	from	the	 individual’s	 face.	 There	 are	 no	 silly	 hats,	 unusual	 chairs,	 or	 attention-grabbing	 trousers	 in	 his	 pictures.	 When	 you	 see	 the	 early	 eighteenth-century	portraits	of	members	of	 the	Kit-Cat	 club	 (of	which	 the	philosopher	 John	Locke	was	also	a	member)	the	first	thing	that	strikes	you	is	the	huge	wig	they	all	wear.	As	 Gombrich	 (1972)	 points	 out,	 these	wigs	 create	 a	 so-called	 “masking	 effect”	whereby	a	strong	impression	impedes	the	perception	of	 lower	thresholds.	That	prominent	 and,	 from	 our	 perspective,	 peculiar	 feature	 makes	 it	 extremely	difficult	 to	see	how	the	 faces	of	 these	Club	members	differ.	As	a	result,	 they	all	look	the	same.	With	Pyke	there	is	no	chance	of	a	similar	distraction.	Because	the	focus	 is	entirely	on	the	 face	 it	 is	not	at	all	hard	to	see	the	sitters	as	 individuals	and	 to	 see	 how	 their	 faces	 differ.	 Once	 more,	 that	 makes	 his	 approach	 very	appropriate,	given	that	his	explicit	aim	is	to	give	these	influential	but	“faceless”	thinkers	a	face.ix		However	that	may	be,	Freeland	is	dismayed	that	there	 is	not	really	anything	to	be	 seen	 about	 philosophers	 per	 se	 in	 the	 series.	 This	 is	 partly	 due	 to	 Pyke’s	decision	to	 leave	out	any	sartorial	or	environmental	detail	and	opt	for	close-up	headshots.	But	 there	 is	more	to	 it	 than	that.	Freeland	 is	also	disappointed	with	the	manner	 in	 which	 these	 close-ups	 are	 made.	 To	 find	 out	 why	 that	 is,	 it	 is	helpful	 to	 compare	 portraits	 of	 philosophers	with	 portraits	 of	 people	 in	 other	professions.	Take	pharmacists.	 Like	philosophers,	 pharmacists	 can	be	depicted	in	 their	professional	role.	But	 to	portray	a	pharmacist	as	a	pharmacist	one	will	need	to	include	some	clues	as	to	their	occupation,	e.g.	a	lab	coat,	some	medicine	bottles,	or	a	pharmacy	cabinet.	Without	any	such	details	 it	seems	impossible	to	portray	a	pharmacist	as	a	pharmacist.			This	is	different	with	philosophers.	It	does	seem	possible	to	portray	someone	as	
a	philosopher	without	including	any	details	in	terms	of	clothing,	setting,	and	tools	of	 the	 trade.	 Just	 consider	 Alfred	 Eisenstaedt’s	 portrait	 of	 Bertrand	 Russell	(1951),	 Albrecht	 Dürer’s	 portrait	 of	 Philip	 Melanchton	 (1526),	 or	 the	 famous	clair-obscure	portrait	of	 Immanuel	Kant	made	by	an	anonymous	painter	 in	 the	18th	 c.	 In	 each	 of	 these	 cases,	 the	 artist	 has	 succeeded	 in	 portraying	 the	philosopher	as	a	philosopher,	not	by	adding	any	extraneous	detail,	but	simply	by	giving	 him	 a	 particularly	 thoughtful	 expression	 or	 an	 ‘air’	 of	 intelligence.	 But	Pyke	 refuses	 to	 adopt	 a	 similar	 strategy	 in	 his	 series.	 And	 this	 is	 a	 source	 of	
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disappointment	 for	 Freeland:	 ‘Arthur	 Danto	 …	 says	 that	 all	 the	 people	 shown	here	 look	 “fiercely	 smart”.	 I	 beg	 to	 differ.	 A	 few	 (you	will	 understand	my	 not	naming	 names)	 look	 a	 bit	 vacant.	 Judith	 Thomson	 looks	 mischievous,	 Peter	Singer	 tired,	 Timothy	 Williamson	 meek...	 Some	 of	 them	 (Ernie	 LePore,	 Harry	Frankfurt)	just	look	like	nice	guys	to	have	a	beer	with	at	the	local	pub’	(2011,	pp.	53-54).	She	adds,	 ‘it	 also	means,	unfortunately,	 that	 if	we	seek	 the	mystique	of	the	philosopher	as	sage	here,	we	will	not	find	it’	(2011,	p.	59).		 	Freeland	 is	 right.	 But	 the	 one	 word	 I	 take	 issue	 with	 is	 ‘unfortunately’.	 The	philosophers	in	Pyke’s	work	are	not	consistently	depicted	as	a	kind	of	sage,	but	I	think	that’s	rather	fortunate	and	fitting.	Consider	the	alternative:	a	book	where	philosophers	would	all	don	looks	of	deep	cogitation.	A	book	of	that	kind	would	create	the	impression	that	philosophers	have	intellectual	powers	that	cannot	but	manifest	 themselves	 in	 their	 appearance.	 Such	 a	 book	 would	 fit	 nicely	 with	Schopenhauer’s	 thesis,	 as	 laid	 down	 in	 his	 essay	 ‘On	 Physiognomy’,	 that	 a	person’s	 intellectual	 capacities	 will	 inevitably	 shine	 through	 in	 their	 face	 and	demeanor:	 ‘Stupid	people	move	like	lay	figures,	while	every	joint	of	 intellectual	people	 speaks	 for	 itself.	 Intellectual	 qualities	 are	 much	 better	 discerned,	however,	 in	 the	 face	 than	 in	gestures	and	movements,	 in	 the	shape	and	size	of	the	forehead,	in	the	contraction	and	movement	of	the	features,	and	especially	in	the	eye’	(Schopenhauer	2010,	p.	280).x		But	this	view	is	now	horribly	outdated	and	the	pseudo-science	of	physiognomy	has	been	widely	debunked.	The	 idea	that,	say,	mischief	and	vice	are	written	on	the	face	of	criminals	is	no	longer	taken	seriously.	Accordingly,	a	portrait	series	of	criminals	 where	 they	 are	 all	 depicted	 as	 criminals	 (with	 faces	 expressive	 of	murderous	thoughts	and	desires)	would	nowadays	be	received	as	quite	dubious.	Well,	equally	dubious,	I	suggest,	would	be	a	portrait	series	of	philosophers	where	they	are	all	depicted	as	philosophers	(with	faces	expressive	of	wisdom	and	deep	thoughts).	And	that	is	precisely	what	Pyke	manages	to	avoid.	As	such,	Pyke	has	got	 the	 better	 of	 Schopenhauer.	 In	 one	 of	 his	 interviews	 he	 explicitly	 states:	 ‘I	have	no	more	reason	to	believe	that	we	can	understand	philosophy	by	looking	at	the	faces	of	its	practicioners	as	I	have	that	we	could	understand	the	complexities	of	a	family	by	studying	its	family	albums	(or	the	minds	of	murderers	by	studying	their	police	portraits)’	(Stanley	2011,	p.	10).		Whereas	 Schopenhauer	 thinks	 that	 blemishes	 must	 point	 to	 intellectual	 and	other	shortcomings,	Pyke’s	portraits	serve	as	a	powerful	rebuttal.	In	that	regard,	incidentally,	 Pyke	 also	 seems	 one	 step	 ahead	 of	 many	 other	 contemporary	photographers.	 As	 Jean	 Baudrillard	 points	 out,	 	 ‘In	 the	 name	 of	 realism	 and	testimony,	 contemporary	 photography	 …	 condemns	 itself	 (and	 not	 just	 in	reportage)	to	photograph	victims	as	such,	the	dead	as	such,	the	poverty	stricken	as	 such,	 left	 entirely	 to	 their	 poverty’	 (Baudrillard	 1999).	 He	 adds:	 ‘this	 self-
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proclaimed	realist	photography	in	no	sense	captures	what	is.	…	It	is	a	moralizing	photography	 (though	 perfectly	 immoral	 in	 the	 aesthetic	 use	 it	 makes	 of	 its	images)’	(Baudrillard	1999).		Sebastiao	Salgado’s	lush	portrayals	of	migrants	and	refugees	come	to	mind	here.	But	one	could	also	think	of	Platon’s	photographs	of	politicians,	 always	depicting	 the	powerful	as	powerful.	 	 (Hence	also	 the	 title	of	the	series:	Power.)		Part	 of	 what	 makes	 Pyke’s	 work	 distinctive	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 seek	 out	 a	distinctively	philosophical	look	or	expression.	(Note	that	the	title	of	his	series	is	not	‘Wisdom’	or	‘Intellect’.)	It	is	not	a	moralizing	photography	and	all	the	better	for	it.	So,	what	he’s	doing	for	individual	philosophers,	he	also	seems	to	be	doing	for	 philosophers	 as	 a	 group,	 that	 is,	 creating	 a	moment	 of	 puzzlement:	 Is	 that	what	 philosophers	 look	 like?	 And,	 again,	 given	 that	 puzzlement	 is	 at	 the	 very	least	a	beautiful	byproduct	of	philosophy,	 I	 think	 that	makes	 the	whole	project	very	fitting,	indeed.xi										
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																																																																																																																																																														iii	To	be	fair,	there	are	more	such	portraits	in	the	second	volume	(2011).	This	may	be	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	philosophers	in	this	volume	are,	on	average,	younger	than	the	subjects	of	the	first	volume.	Another	reason	why	they	may	appear	less	‘foreign’	has	to	do	with	Pyke’s	own	maturation	as	artist:	‘Prior	to	having	myself	traveled	a	long	course	of	disciplined	creation,	there	was	a	certain	reverence.	…	As	one’s	understanding	of	mankind	matures,	one’s	sense	of	the	foreigness	of	other	paths	erodes.’	And	this,	he	suggests,	‘has	ultimately	changed	the	portraits	and	made	my	subjects	perhaps	seem	more	humane’	(Stanley	2011,	10).	iv	It’s	worth	noting	in	this	respect	that	Pyke	also	asked	all	philosophers	to	contribute	50	words	capturing	their	particular	philosophy.		v	There’s	an	obvious	link	here	with	one	of	the	most	famous	and	influential	photographic	series,	as	Pyke	himself	acknowledges:	‘I	realized	that	philosophers	form	a	community,	not	unlike	the	communities	represented	in	August	Sander’s	People	of	the	20th	C’	(Stanley	2011:	11).	But	Pyke	is	not	simply	following	in	Sander’s	footsteps.	His	project	is	quite	distinctive.	Whereas		Sander	is	mainly,	or	perhaps	even	exclusively,	interested	in	people	as	representatives	of	a	particular	community	or	class,	Pyke	is	much	more	interested	in	people	as	individuals.	Sander’s	pictures	bear	generic	titles	(e.g.	“Police	constable,	1925”,	“Grammar-school	girl,	1928”,	“The	painter”,	1924),	but	Pyke’s	philosophers	are	all	individualized.	Pyke’s	focus	is	also	on	the	individual	face,	whereas	Sander’s	portraits	are	often	full-figure,	deliberately	depicting	the	posture,	clothes,	tools,	and	surroundings	thought	to	be	indicative	of	the	group	or	profession	to	which	the	subject	belongs.				vi	That	is	why,	at	live	concerts,	the	greatest	fans	will	often	want	to	be	as	near	to	the	stage	as	possible,	or	why	many	people	reportedly	wish	to	touch,	hug,	or	just	shake	hands	with	(whoever	happens	to	be)	their	idol.	Carolyn	Korsmeyer	thematizes	this	in	her	work	on	the	aesthetics	of	the	genuine	(2012).		vii	Not	all	sitters	will	have	been	equally	comfortable	with	this	kind	of	intimacy.	Some,	I	know	from	personal	testimony,	would	have	preferred	to	have	kept	the	photographer	and	the	viewer	at	more	of	a	distance.	(It	is	perhaps	not	a	surprise	that	David	Velleman,	who	places	such	emphasis	on	self-presentation,	as	is	explained	in	Costello’s	contribution	to	this	volume,	refused	to	be	portrayed	by	Steve	Pyke.)	viii	Freeland	is	drawing	on	Barthes	here:	‘All	the	photographs	of	my	mother	which	I	was	looking	through	were	a	little	like	so	many	masks;	at	the	last,	suddenly	the	mask	vanished:	there	remained	a	soul,	ageless	but	not	timeless,	since	this	air	was	the	person	I	used	to	see,	consubstantial	with	her	face,	each	day	of	her	long	life.’	(Barthes	109)	ix	There	are	other	reasons	why	Pyke’s	portrait	series	might	be	considered	appropriate	for	its	subject.	For	instance,	his	photographs	are	quite	‘truthful’	in	that	he	uses	no	Photoshop,	no	artificial	light,	no	theatrical	poses.		Moreover,	the	high-contrast	black	and	white	fits	well	with	the	popular	image	of	philosophers	seeking	light	in	the	darkness.	There	is	also	his	focus	on	the	head	as	the	seat	of	thought.	And,	finally,	his	portraits	aptly	convey	that	all	abstract	philosophical	systems	ultimately	originate	in	people	of	flesh	and	blood,	who	are	often	more	vulnerable	and	frail	than	the	neatly	construed	and	robust	theories	they	gave	birth	to.	(I	am	grateful	to	Eileen	John	for	this	last	suggestion.)		x	As	he	also	states	at	the	outset	of	the	essay:	‘that	the	outside	reflects	the	inner	man,	and	that	the	face	expresses	his	whole	character,	is	an	obvious	supposition	and	accordingly	a	safe	one,	demonstrated	as	it	is	in	the	desire	people	have	to	see	on	all	occasions	a	man	who	has	distinguished	himself’	(Schopenhauer	2010:	271)	xi	A	distant	cousin	of	this	paper	was	presented	at	the	London	Aesthetics	Forum,	the	White	Rose	Aesthetics	Forum,	the	Scottish	Aesthetics	Forum,	the	ASA	Eastern	Meeting,	the	Dubrovnik	Philosophy	of	Art	Conference,	and	the	universities	of	Murcia,	Warsaw,	Warwick,	and	Antwerp.	I	want	to	thank	the	various	audiences	(and	in	particular	Maria	José	Alcarez	León,	Adam	Andrzejewski,	Diarmuid	Costello,	Victor	Durà-Villà,	Steven	Houlgate,	and	Andrew	Huddleston)	for	their	valuable	comments	on	my	proposed	ideas.	I	also	wish	to	thank	the	students	on	my	module	The	Art	of	Portraiture:	Historical	and	Philosophical	Perspectives	whose	enthusiastic	questions	and	suggestions	have	helped	to	make	this	a	better	paper.			
